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Abstract  
 
What are the consequences of the tendency for ubiquitous online reputation calculation to 
lead not to more precise expressions of reputation capital, but, rather, to greater reputational 
instability? This article contrasts two conceptions of online reputation, which enact opposing 
attitudes about the relation between reputation and the calculable. According to an early 
online reputation paradigm – reputation capital – users strove to achieve high scores, 
performing the presumption that reputation could be incrementally accumulated and 
consistently measured within relatively stable spheres of value. Yet, ubiquitous calculation 
led not to more precise measurements of reputation, but rather to the increasing volatility of 
online reputation. Thus, a second online reputation paradigm – reputation warfare – has 
become increasingly prevalent, in which strategic actors indirectly capitalize on systemic 
volatility produced by reputation’s ubiquitous online calculation. Steve Bannon’s 2016 
Trump campaign strategy, which mobilized trolls, exemplifies the indirect optimization of 
online reputation, placing an option on reputational volatility.  
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Introduction 
 In online environments, reputation is pervasively quantified. Ebay sellers, TaskRabbit 
taskers and Airbnb hosts strive for high scores. Facebook ‘Likes’ and article view counts 
promise to render popularity palpable. Online reputation is a complex and contested 
construct, co-constituted across countless utterances, acts, judgments and calculations, 
involving myriad actors, apparatuses, governing bodies and networks. In spite of this 
complexity, online reputation’s quantified expressions purport to place it robustly within the 
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realm of the calculable. Yet, with the pervasive optimism that online reputation can be 
readily quantified also comes great anxiety about the instability of online reputations. Online 
trolling flourishes alongside Online Reputation Systems. Victims of online attacks have 
experienced how changeable reputation can be in highly networked environments – and how 
systemic vulnerabilities (the promiscuous circulation of images and data) can be reframed as 
online users’ personal transgressions (Chun, 2016: 145), often along racialized, gendered 
lines (Osucha, 2009; Nakamura, 2009). In the 2016 U.S. presidential race, candidate Donald 
Trump’s late-arriving chief campaign strategist, Steve Bannon, made extensive use of online 
trolls, encouraging them to contribute their own anti-Hillary Clinton memes to Trump’s 
campaign. While reputational attack has long been used in the pursuit of money, social 
advantage, political gain, justice and revenge (Hepworth, 1975), such tactics have ‘scaled up’ 
online. What are the consequences of the tendency for the ubiquitous foregrounding of 
reputation in online platforms to set the stage for increased conflict over the value of 
reputations?  
This paper argues that there has been a recent shift between two predominant 
paradigms of online reputation, which enact opposing attitudes about the relation between 
reputation and the calculable: an incremental paradigm – reputation capital – and a volatile 
paradigm – reputation warfare. Prior to 2016, particularly within the ‘sharing economy,’ a 
predominant understanding of online reputation, reputation capital, presumed that online 
reputation’s value accumulated relatively stably over time, ‘adding up’ as positive platform-
based interactions increased. Myriad apparatuses for measuring online reputation tacitly 
performed the presumption that reputation could be ever more accurately measured with 
sustained platform interactions, although measuring reputation has never been a 
straightforward proposition. However, from the ubiquitous calculation of online reputation 
emerged a second, volatile paradigm of online reputation – reputation warfare – which 
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emphasizes the conflicts that inevitably arise over constantly-calculated reputational capital. 
The reputation warfare paradigm emphasizes volatile and indirect means for understanding 
the value of online reputation. Online reputation decisively breaks from steady, incremental 
accumulation, particularly on platforms that do not share a stake in upholding their users’ 
reputations; further, strategic actors produce means to capitalize on others’ reputational 
volatility. I define reputational volatility as the dispersion of reputational risk – potential 
gains and losses in reputation capital – rendered visible and actionable by platform metrics 
(such as star ratings and ‘Likes’) and the interactions through which they accrue. Many 
online platforms, such as Amazon and Twitter, make volatility readily available to 
reputational thinking, enabling users to visualize a measurable range of reputational values. 
Donald Trump’s 2016 presidential election campaign capitalized on systemic volatility, 
producing what corporate financiers might call a ‘real option’ on reputational volatility. Steve 
Bannon understood online crowds as optionable swarms of racist, misogynist and anti-
political-correctness reputational violence, and thus understood reputation’s volatility as itself 
a potential source of value. (While this paper focuses on Bannon, similar risk-based 
understandings of online reputation could also be identified in left-leaning hashtag activist 
movements.) The three sections below – Reputation Capital, Reputational Volatility, and 
Reputation Warfare – aim to demonstrate a progressive shift in discursive attention over the 
last decade or so, away from an incremental understanding of online reputation, and toward 
an increasing operationalization of reputational volatility. In light of this paradigmatic shift, 
the conclusion further considers the need to theorize online reputation as financialized 
reputation – for which an understanding of volatility is key. 
Reputation Capital 
The early 2010s witnessed a wave of enthusiasm for online reputation. Advocates of 
the so-called ‘sharing economy’ (comprised of online platforms facilitating collaborative 
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consumption and peer-to-peer exchange) claimed that reputational measures reliably 
translated trustworthiness across disparate contexts. As Rachel Botsman proclaimed:  
Imagine a world where banks take into account your online reputation alongside 
traditional credit ratings to determine your loan; where headhunters hire you based on 
the expertise you've demonstrated on online forums such as Quora […] Welcome to 
the reputation economy, where your online history becomes more powerful than your 
credit history (2012).  
For Botsman, measuring reputation capital online enabled peer-to-peer sharing across 
networks, empowering users. This characterization seems over-simple in light of recent 
developments – from critiques of labour conditions in the sharing economy (Martin, 2016; 
Scholz, 2017; Schor et al., 2015), to online defamation (Cheung and Schulz, 2018), to the 
dystopian implications of China’s Social Credit System, set to become mandatory by 2020, 
which assigns each citizen a universal ‘sincerity’ score (Backer, 2017). Nonetheless, it 
typifies the reputation capital paradigm of online reputation. This paradigm, firstly, 
understands online reputation capital as an intangible asset; and secondly, posits an 
incremental understanding of the accumulation of online reputational value, performing the 
presumption that online reputational value could straightforwardly ‘add up’ across platforms. 
This section offers a brief contextualization of the reputation capital paradigm, and surveys 
some recent theories of reputation. It then argues the need for a theory of online reputation as 
financialized reputation. As we shall see, the metrification of online reputation, far from 
‘pinning down’ the value of reputation capital, set the stage for reputational volatility to come 
to the fore.  
Defining Reputation Capital 
First, it is necessary to contextualize the term ‘reputation capital,’ used with some 
frequency in management studies, socio-economics, and even self-help literature, though far 
less often clearly defined. Broadly speaking, reputation capital could be defined as the 
aggregated value of signs indicating the perceived esteem, honour, respect, likability, 
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importance and/or trustworthiness attributed to a given person or entity, understood as that 
person or entity’s intangible asset. For example, in the Botsman passage above, 
heterogeneous signs attributing expertise and trustworthiness to an online user, from star 
ratings acquired as an Airbnb host to becoming a ‘most viewed writer’ on Quora, generalize 
beyond the platforms on which they accrue, as reputation capital. This intangible asset 
translates across contexts, and may lead to indirect monetary rewards (such as a lower 
interest rate on a loan, or better chances when applying for a job). From a management 
studies perspective, Kolesnikova, Fakhrutdinova and Zagidullina argue that personal 
reputation is partially, but not solely, a subsidiary form of human capital; since reputation 
capital is inevitably based on information circulating around its object, it transcends the 
bounds of human capital (2016: 80). Reputation capital also borrows from social capital, in 
that it encapsulates particular social attitudes toward its object (ibid.: 80). In spite of the 
tendency to associate reputation with social capital (ibid.; Origgi, 2018, 98; Gandini, 2015: 
28), Pierre Bourdieu’s sociological work might better cast online reputation as a form of 
symbolic capital, defined as “any property (any form of capital whether physical, economic, 
cultural or social) when it is perceived by social agents endowed with categories of 
perception which cause them to know it and to recognize it, to give it value” – for instance, 
honour as a form of repute (Bourdieu, 1994: 8). Symbolic capital is not a form of capital in 
itself; rather, it is an effect of capital, and one that guarantees other forms of capital’s 
effectiveness. Thus, online reputation might be understood as a meta-logic that tends toward 
volatility (as we shall see below) precisely because it is based on the groundless self-
referentiality of symbolic capital.i  
Theorizing Reputation 
Though increasingly visible online, reputation has remained an under-theorized 
concept until relatively recently; current work from a variety of disciplines has begun to 
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further consider how reputation has changed within post-digital contexts, and interrogate the 
tricky relationship between reputation and value. As Gloria Origgi writes, “reputations are 
made or lost within dynamic processes. Social capital is therefore uncertain capital” (2018: 
98, emphasis in original). Yet reputation, however biased and flawed, remains an 
indispensable social-epistemological tool within information-rich societies. Due to the sheer 
volume of information, assessing the reputations of those who proffer information 
supplements necessary judgments of that information’s quality (Origgi, 2012). Drawing from 
social epistemology, Bourdieu’s account of social capital (2005), the Sociology of Valuation 
and Evaluation, and Erving Goffman’s writings on the presentation of self in everyday life 
(1956), Origgi theorizes reputation’s dynamic processes: for instance, the robustness of 
reputational signals (how difficult they are to fake); the informational asymmetry inherent in 
scenarios in which reputations are assessed (for instance, when non-experts must choose 
experts) (2018: 108); and the ways in which group dynamics (for instance, open vs. closed 
networks) affect the spread of reputations (ibid.: 96).  
Alessandro Gandini analyses reputation as a newly foregrounded product of digital 
cognitive labour. Combining labour process theory, digital sociology and critical 
management studies, he theorizes ‘the role of reputation as a specific form of individual 
social capital for knowledge workers, that finds empirical visibility and potential 
measurability across online social media platforms’ (2015: 2). Focusing on digital 
marketplaces for freelance knowledge work such as Upwork, Gandini highlights that ‘one’s 
personal reputation within the knowledge economy is today a newly determinant element for 
career success’ that ‘translates social interaction into economic outcomes’ (ibid.: 8). 
Freelancers work on their reputations as a form of ‘venture labour’ (ibid.: 91): investment in 
some indeterminate future payoff, in the form of more available work. Thus, understanding 
reputation as ‘the social capital of a digital society’ (ibid.: 28) nuances discussions of 
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immaterial labour and virtuosity within freelance knowledge work, providing new means to 
critique (self-)exploitation in online platforms. 
Alison Hearn has described online reputation as a networked logic of selfhood, which 
inscribes power relations between platforms and users. Drawing from Barbara Ehrenreich 
(2009), and Maurizio Lazzarato (1996), Hearn critiqued the ‘smiley-faced’ disposition of the 
online reputation economy as, ultimately, an expression of the power of companies who 
benefit from the pressure users feel to maintain stellar online reputations (2010). More 
recently (2016), she has argued that the predominance of reputation, incubated in reality 
television’s promise of mini-celebrity and perpetuated by social media, reshapes the political 
sphere, such that ‘For Trump’s followers, his brand is his substantive skill set and all the 
qualification he needs to become president’ (2016: 658). As Hearn quips, Trump ‘embodies 
what many people are now doing daily. In this age of perpetual connection and high stakes 
visibility, everyone is required to hustle and shill, to be a little bit “Trump”’ (ibid.: 658). This 
ubiquitous emphasis on reputation-seeking for its own sake marks a shift toward what Hearn 
describes as a speculative self:   
… we can posit a move from the “flexible personality” of the late 1990s and the “self-
brander” of the 2000s, to the “anticipatory, speculative self” of 2016. Here, the pursuit 
of meaningful individual identity, autonomous forms of self-presentation, and 
processes of self-valorization have come to function in an entirely different register; 
their actual intent, content or outcome matter little – what matters is that they are 
pursued, and ceaselessly, relentlessly so. […] Mirroring the speculative logics of 
finance capitalism, the speculative self’s value is predicated entirely on externally 
generated predictions about our future potential “optimization” (Hearn, 2017: 74).  
 
For Hearn, what Gandini might call ‘venture labour’ has significance far beyond the gig 
economy, shifting online self-performance ever closer to financial speculation.  
Michel Feher’s Rated Agency: Investee Politics in a Speculative Age (2018) expands 
on the possibilities for activist interventions in the speculative spheres of reputation. 
Reputation, which Feher describes as one of several ‘flavours’ of creditworthiness (others of 
 8 
which include funding and trust) (2018: 227), becomes an increasingly important site of 
intervention in neoliberal milieus. Due to the vast expansion of the credit market in the Regan 
and Thatcher 1980s, the pursuit of creditworthiness has outstripped the pursuit of profit in 
importance for neoliberal subjects (seeking loans or opportunities), corporations (appealing to 
shareholders) and governments (appeasing bondholders). Given the predominance of 
creditworthiness in all its forms, neoliberal-era activists must understand themselves as 
investees, and see acts of rating and ranking as viable sites of intervention:  
…however constrained by what credit providers deem appreciable, investees are still 
endowed with an agency – rated as it were – that empowers them not only to invest in 
their own reputational capital, but also to speculate, with other like-minded investees, 
on what assets should be recognized as appreciable and thus on who deserves to be 
called creditworthy (Feher, 2018: 210-211). 
 
Both Hearn and Feher emphasize the importance of speculation in theorizing contemporary 
reputation; for the former, as a newly externalized identity-form; for the latter, as a ground 
for resistance through counter-speculation.  
Financializing Reputation 
Hearn and Feher already point to the claim that online reputation is financialized 
reputation – a crucial basis for the volatile, reputation warfare paradigm. Below, I extend 
their important work by considering how particular financial meta-logics and apparatuses, 
such as volatility and real options, nuance accounts of financialized reputation – but first, it is 
necessary to further elaborate on how and why reputation might be understood as 
financialized. While there are many strains within financialization theory (Van der Zwan, 
2014), online reputation might be broadly understood according to what Randy Martin 
termed the ‘financialization of daily life’ (2002): financially driven market expansions 
reshaping the ‘typical habits of life’ (ibid.: 7). More specifically, recent examinations of the 
relationships between data, finance and social media enable detailed understandings of how 
market expansions are able to access and capitalize on daily life processes, and thus enact 
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biopolitical power (Foucault, 1980, 2003). Louise Amoore has described aggregated scores 
derived from disaggregated data sets as ‘data derivatives’ (2011). Like financial derivatives, 
data derivatives are derived from, yet indifferent to, underlying assets (such as the lives 
reputational scores ostensibly represent). Appearing as scores and symbols on screens, data 
derivatives make data actionable in real time:  
… screened scores and red and blue maps appear acutely visual. Yet, the appeal to the 
‘sovereign sense’ of the visual further establishes the data derivative as an already 
encoded set of possibilities, this apparently ‘most reliable’ of senses underwriting the 
rationality of the association (2011: 34).  
 
Though aggregated according to complex methods, data derivatives’ simple visual 
appearance renders them intuitive and actionable – a crucial means for enabling speculation. 
Adam Arvidsson (2016) argues that Facebook is embedded in the logic of the financial level 
of the economy, and enacts a ‘social logic of the derivative’ (Martin, 2015): firstly, insofar as 
Facebook mirrors the logic of finance; secondly, since Facebook’s innovations share a 
common genealogy with financial innovations via shifts in the logic of branding, which 
understood ‘lifestyle’ itself as ‘a derived asset’ (Arvidsson, 2016: 15); and thirdly, insofar as 
Facebook envisions itself “enabling new and more detailed forms of credit ratings, the 
pricing of health insurance, and the valuation of freelance labor based on reputational 
measurements of risk” in future (ibid.: 18). Thus,  
Facebook comes to perform the direct biopolitical function of financial capital, 
integrating ordinary life into its processes in a calculable way. It provides a way of 
giving universal value to the lived excess of the global multitude while abstracting 
from its lived practice (ibid.).  
 
These works provide a crucial basis for the claim that metrified online reputation is 
financialized reputation – insofar as its aggregated, visible signs are rendered actionable and 
integrable with daily life processes, yet also abstracted from these. Extending from this work 
below, I will explore how the values associated with these signs tend toward volatility – and 
how the volatile logic of financialized reputation might operate across online platforms and 
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not just within them – even in cases in which online behaviours (from participating in 
someone’s online shaming to sharing politically motivated memes) may not be directly 
motivated by the desire to gain money, credit, or repute.  
Unstable Measures 
The theories of reputation above hint at some of the reasons why the incremental, 
reputation capital paradigm has given way to the volatile paradigm of reputation warfare 
(below). There are two further reasons for the increasing instability of online reputation that 
are worth underscoring: the recursivity of measures, and the complexities of platform-profile 
synergies. Of course, quantitative reputational measures, such as the FICO® credit score, 
predate the World Wide Web (McClanahan, 2014; Poon, 2009); equally, informal, ostensibly 
qualitative means of evaluating reputation (such as gossip) persist today alongside 
reputational metrics. Nonetheless, pervasive online rankings and ratings have vastly 
increased the visibility of reputation metrics between users (Gandini, 2015: 38) – and 
multiplied their uses ‘behind the scenes’ in the form of corporate databases (Pasquale, 2015) 
and Online Reputation Systems allowing for the calculation and display of reputational 
scores (Gandini, 2015: 30). The pervasive drive to quantify reputation online, which blurs the 
distinction between ‘economic’ and ‘other’ values, finds an early precursor in Gabriel 
Tarde’s Economic Psychology (1902/2007), which argued for economics to understand value 
as quantifiable not in spite of, but precisely because it was (inter-)subjective. Tarde called for 
economists to quantify a far broader range of values, including glory, insisting that all 
assessments (even the most informal, like gossip) had a ‘quantitative core’ (Latour and 
Lepinay, 2007: 11-12). In Tarde’s time, newspapers made reputations’ ebb and flow newly 
tangible. Today, as Facebook ‘Likes’ exercise the ‘capacity to instantly metrify and intensify 
user affects’ (Gerlitz and Helmond, 2013: 1349), Tarde’s expanded theory of economic 
values seems all the more prescient – although ‘Likes’ and similar apparatuses foreground the 
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recursivity of measures (their capacity to intensify the very affects they ostensibly record) to 
an extent that Tarde might not have fully anticipated.  
Recent theorists have elaborated on how social measures of value actively reshape the 
spheres of valuation in which they operate. As Celia Lury, Luciana Parisi and Tiziana 
Terranova argue, the ‘circulation of social quanta of beliefs and desires’ (2012: 19) that Tarde 
described has become part of a widespread becoming-topological of culture: a ‘new order of 
spatio-temporal continuity of forms of economic, political and cultural life today’ (ibid.: 4), 
fuelled by continual feedback between live data and automated information processing. 
Andrea Mubi Brighenti has elaborated on Tarde’s observation that, as he puts it, ‘measures 
turn what we want into what we believe’ (Brighenti, 2017: 29, emphasis in original); thus, 
‘the relation between measure and value is necessarily circular – better, entangled’ (ibid.: 23). 
These authors’ attention to the blurred distinction between measurement and the measured 
helps to conceptualize how reputational metrics, which might have aimed to clearly define 
reputation capital, instead intensify reputation’s recursivity, thereby leading to more systemic 
volatility.   
It is also key to understand how online reputations perform synergies (or discord) 
between platforms’ and users’ reputations. As Natalie Roxburgh (2016) has argued, the 
fledgling Bank of England’s success in the mid-17th century depended on a virtuous feedback 
loop, according to which financial subjects learned to align their private credit (their 
reputations) with the Bank’s public credit (its reputation as a public institution, representing 
the public good). Early banks produced more banknotes than they had backed up in bullion; 
thus, a run on the bank, resulting from a collapse of trust, was an inherent risk. Establishing a 
feedback loop between public and private credit, such that customers’ and banks’ trustworthy 
behaviour and good reputations would mutually reinforce each other, was the basis through 
which the Bank could produce relatively stable circulations of currency in the first place. The 
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‘smiley-faced’ online reputation economy that Hearn denigrates – the slightly nervous feeling 
that one must uphold everyone else’s reputation in hopes that the favour might be returned 
(2010) – operates according to a similar feedback loop, which ultimately aligns online users’ 
and platforms’ good reputations. Private credit is not simply speculation on personal 
trustworthiness or worth; it is also the performance of provisional agreements or tensions 
between a user’s value, and the value of the institutions through which that user’s reputation 
has been rendered legible. Whereas a ‘sharing’ platform like Airbnb has a clear stake in 
upholding its users’ reputations (it stands to earn more when both its users and its 
reputational measures are trusted), a site like Twitter, which simply seeks increased platform 
engagement, does not necessarily share a stake in upholding any particular user’s reputation. 
Platforms without a clear stake in upholding users’ reputations may be more likely to 
exacerbate some users’ reputational volatility. 
Reputational Volatility 
Following Origgi (2018: 98), we might easily agree that reputation remains uncertain. 
But when did it become volatile? In this section, I argue that the ubiquitous calculation of 
online reputation does not reduce reputation’s uncertainty, producing more ‘stable’ 
expressions of reputation capital. Rather, it translates reputational uncertainty into 
reputational volatility. Uncertainty refers to the unpredictability of future outcomes, given 
imperfect information and/or multiple unknowns. In contrast, volatility implies a propensity 
for changeability, which in finance has come to be understood according to a statistically 
measurable dispersion of values: the range of returns associated with a particular security. 
Benjamin Lee writes, “volatility is the randomness in things that is felt as the intensity of 
change. In finance this instantaneous or ‘actual’ volatility is transformed into a historically 
based statistical measure, the standard deviation of price movements over some fixed time 
frame” (Lee, 2016: 4). For Lee, derivative finance’s fundamental breakthrough was “the 
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discovery and pricing of volatility” with the early 1970s Black-Scholes pricing formula 
(ibid.: 4). Thus, literature on risk societies (Beck, 1992; Giddens, 1999), could expand to 
more clearly distinguish between uncertainty and volatility, and address the gap between 
volatility in finance and the social sciences: 
…most social science research does not clearly distinguish risk and uncertainty from 
volatility. The distinction is the fundamental insight of Black-Scholes and is 
foundational for contemporary financial capitalism. At the same time, financial work 
on volatility tends to focus on its mathematical aspects, eschewing the social and 
cultural dimensions of volatility that trading and market activity presuppose (Lee, 
2016: 4). 
 
According to this much-needed expansion, online reputation could be understood as 
expressing a conception of dispersion germane to that of financial market volatility.  
Instantiating Reputational Volatility 
The development of a volatility-based understanding of reputation could arguably be 
traced back at least to reputation’s early quantification with the FICO® credit score, through 
which it became intuitive to visualize a range of possible reputation ‘scores’ (say, from 300-
850). Within the post-digital context on which I focus here, Online Reputation Systems – 
computational apparatuses, such as eBay seller rating systems, which seem pervasively aimed 
toward ‘pinning down’ the value of online reputations – produce the preconditions for the 
emergence of online reputation’s increasingly foregrounded expression of volatility as a 
cultural logic. Think, for instance, of a relatively simple Online Reputation System: 
Amazon’s seller ratings. Looking up a book on amazon.co.uk, I receive a list of 23 sellers 
(including Amazon itself) from whom I could purchase it. Seller information for vendors 
other than Amazon includes a percentage of positive ratings (eg. 98% positive) over the last 
12 months, accompanied with a star-rating icon illustrating the given percentage, and the total 
number of ratings the seller has received. The positive ratings range, in my sample search, 
from 79 – 100%, and numbers of seller ratings range from 9 – 3,907,325. Seller metrics are 
not the only reputational metrics Amazon employs (which also include product reviews, for 
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instance) and they may often only reinforce purchasers’ decisions, primarily based on price. 
Nonetheless, by translating trustworthiness into percentage points, these metrics express the 
ready availability of volatility to reputational thinking. Using Amazon’s Online Reputation 
Systems as a visualization aid, prospective purchasers can easily translate uncertainty – will 
my purchase arrive without a hitch? – into volatility: a sense of the range of deviations from 
the standard of excellent service and timely delivery within the past year. Amazon’s Online 
Reputation System foregrounds the range of customer experiences associated with each seller 
within a given timeframe. The absence of reputation metrics for Amazon itself expresses the 
platform’s exemption from ‘transparent’ reputational measurement when it competes with its 
complementors (Zhu and Liu, 2018), and hints at a meta-reputational logic: that the 
complementor businesses’ ratings are displayed to reinforce Amazon’s reputation as the 
platform that holds its hosted sellers to account. With a similar logic, some online discussion 
forums, such the mountain biking forum mtbr.com, attempt to increase the quality of 
discussion threads by assigning users ‘reputation rating’ and ‘reputation power’ scores, which 
aggregate all scores the user’s posts have been given by others, and give more established 
users higher weighting when they rank others, respectively (mtbr.com, 2011). Users see other 
users according to a range of possible scores. Online Reputation Systems impart a dispersion-
image of reputation: a means to visualize the range of possible measurable values, alongside 
the qualities of particular profiles and posts. 
Increasing Volatility 
Online platforms and Online Reputation Systems not only visualize, but can also 
actively increase the volatility of online reputations, for several reasons. In addition to the 
recursivity of measures and the potentially discordant relations between profiles’ and 
platforms’ stakes mentioned above, acts of online reputational violence – intended and/or 
automated attacks on users’ online images, which sabotage their social standing – have 
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become increasingly visible in recent years. Feedback loops between profile and platform 
reputations – or, indeed, between various users’ reputations – can be reversed, so that an 
attack on someone’s reputational capital might be viewed as the source of potential increase 
in a perpetrator or platform’s stakes. Even if a perpetrator does not have a direct stake in 
tarnishing another user’s reputation (i.e. they will not profit from it), they may act on the 
possibility that their relative reputation capital will increase by virtue of having less 
instability than the local ‘market average’. 
Of course, reputational attack, in itself, is nothing new (Hepworth, 1975). In the 
digital age, however, reputational measures weave themselves ever more tightly into online 
users’ potential to act. Databases remember pasts all too well – so much so that, as Viktor 
Mayer-Schönberger argued, we need to reassert the right to be forgotten (2009). This 
profoundly reshapes reputational violence. Revenge porn and other acts of online defamation 
can have adverse mental health effects which survivors perceive as far worse than physical 
violence (Bates, 2017: 32). For-profit revenge porn sites, such as myex.com (shut down by 
the US Federal Trade Commission in 2018), which encouraged men to post intimate images 
of ex-partners without permission, established ‘online shaming… as a profitable business 
enterprise, constituent of a political economy of reputation’ (Langlois and Slane, 2017: 121). 
Various commentators have spoken of the racialized and gendered lines along which 
reputational attack is meted out (Abbott, 2017), personalizing and gendering the pervasive 
promiscuity of networks as ‘female shame’ (Chun, 2016: 135-165).  
The recursivity of measures; the prominence of platforms that maximize engagement 
without seeking to increase their users’ reputations; and online reputational attacks all 
increase the volatility of online reputations. To get a sense of how these factors intertwine, it 
is worth considering an example of extreme online shaming. In December 2013, Justine 
Sacco, a publicist with 170 Twitter followers, became the number one worldwide trend on 
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Twitter. Just before boarding a plane to South Africa, she posted a distasteful tweet (“Going 
to Africa. Hope I don’t get AIDS. Just kidding. I’m white!”), which she intended as a parody 
of white privilege – but which many Twitter users took to be blatantly racist. In a matter of 
hours, tens of thousands of users piled on to shame her. The Twitter storm is thought to have 
erupted after Gawker journalist Sam Biddle, who had 15,000 Twitter followers, retweeted 
Sacco, thereby greatly expanding the reach of her tweet – and the extent of her shaming 
(Ronson, 2015:73). The hashtag #HasJustineLandedYet went viral – aided by Twitter’s new 
‘trending’ algorithms, launched in 2013 – as online crowds anticipated the moment Sacco got 
off the plane, turned on her phone, and realized her life had profoundly changed. An image of 
Topsy’s analytics for Justine Sacco on Twitter in late December 2013 (Figure 1) expresses 
Sacco’s notoriety as a distribution, and encapsulates the capacity for reputational volatility to 
drastically increase on platforms seeking to fuel engagement, with little stake in bolstering 
their users’ reputations. (One might imagine a similar graph for a user suddenly subject to 
intense adulation; increased quantities of attention can be positive, ambivalent or negative 
and thus do not straightforwardly correlate to reputation.) The graph translates the 
unpredictability of Sacco’s shaming – who could have known the extent to which she would 
be retweeted? – into an image of volatility: a measurable distribution of notoriety. Her 
analytics encapsulate the scope of reputational risk on a platform that allows tweets to be 
reposted far beyond the bounds of a user’s social network, vastly expanding their reach 
according to a logic of contagion (Parikka, 2007) which feeds volatility. 
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Figure 1. Topsy graph of “Justine Sacco” on Twitter, 18-24 December, 2013 (Source: Hewitt, 
2013) 
 
Volatile Behaviours 
Online shaming – one contributing factor to reputational volatility – might be 
understood as ‘volatile behaviour’: user behaviour attuned to inciting the changeability of 
reputations. This is prevalent in cases of online shaming on platforms such as 4chan, 8chan 
and reddit, routinely filled with racist, misogynist, anti-Semitic, and homophobic abuse – and 
which platform delight in the spectacle of actively changing reputations. Such platforms were 
highly influential in the Trump presidential campaign. Angela Nagle argues that a pervasive 
culture of self-deprecating, abject anti-political-correctness on such platforms is in part a 
rejection of what she terms ‘competitive virtue signalling’ (2017: 5) on left-leaning online 
platforms such as Tumblr. Ultra-politically correct ‘call-out culture’ 
…is about creating scarcity in an environment in which virtue is the currency that can 
make or break the career or social success of an online user […] the counterforce of 
which was the anonymous underworld from which the right-wing trolling cultures 
emerged (ibid.: 76).ii 
 
Nagle extends previous studies of online trolling (Phillips, 2015; Mantilla, 2013; Milner, 
2013) for a moment at which its political import (though still conflicted and complex) has 
become clearer. Self-identified trolls, according to Whitney Phillips, tend to be ‘relatively 
privileged white males” (2015: 142), and express ‘a profound sense of entitlement, one 
spurred by expansionist and colonialist ideologies’ (2015: 43). Even as they are often 
relatively privileged, trolls ambivalently reject online reputational measures – forfeiting their 
online virtue as a means to enjoy the pleasurable spectacle of increasing others’ reputational 
volatility. Doing so might improve their reputations within online subcultures (such as 4chan 
boards).  
Indeed, ‘volatile behaviours’ (including shaming, cyberbullying, and trolling aimed at 
inciting the changeability of online reputation) may be read, in part, as amplifications of the 
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volatility already present in countless online infrastructures that measure reputation. ‘Likes’, 
ratings, credit scores and identification calculations already instantiate a meta-violent 
(ill)logic, which re-personalizes the ‘impersonal’ reputational measurements pervasively 
made online. Writing of private credit-scoring databases, whose unchecked errors can ruin 
credit scores for years, Frank Pasquale writes, ‘reputation systems are creating new (and 
largely invisible) minorities, disfavoured due to error or unfairness. Algorithms are not 
immune from the fundamental problem of discrimination, in which negative and baseless 
assumptions congeal into prejudice’ (2015: 38). Databases, platforms and users partake of 
various volatile operations and behaviours – and afford varying levels of immunity to 
subjects whose identity more- or less-readily shields them from discreditation.  
Reputation Warfare 
Online reputational volatility exacerbates the troubled boundaries and mutating scales 
of subjects’ network extensivity. What I term reputation warfare aims to capitalize on 
reputational volatility at large scale.iii A recent iteration of this paradigm, Donald Trump’s 
2016 presidential campaign, conceptualized online communities as producers of reputational 
volatility, which could then be optimized, using real options theory-inflected tactics. If 
political campaigns are theatres of reputation – arenas in which politicians’ personal 
reputations are circulated, judged, and, to a certain extent, ‘voted on’ – then Steve Bannon 
effectively rethought the political theatre of reputation for an age of online platforms. 
(Equally, activists mobilize interventions into reputational volatility within the ‘court of 
public opinion’ instantiated by hashtag activism.) My use of the term ‘warfare’ to describe 
this paradigm highlights the intensity of tactical interventions into the conflicted edges of 
online reputation. It is predicated, in part, on a breakdown of the seventeenth-century 
distinction between war and peace (Davies, 2018: xi), which, as Will Davies has recently 
argued, inflects practices of daily life – as seen, for instance, in persistent references to the 
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weaponization of ‘everyday tools:’ from planes used in terrorist attacks to memes in online 
forums (ibid.: 18). Following Davies, we might say that online reputation itself has been 
weaponized. 
Of course, Bannon is not the first campaign chief executive to rethink online strategy; 
indeed, Barack Obama’s 2008 U.S. election campaign was considered ground-breaking in its 
ability to harness grassroots efforts online (Levenshus, 2010). Yet Obama’s online campaign 
strategy instantiated a virtuous feedback loop of mutually reinforcing, shared values. 
Bannon’s harnessed online vitriol on a massive scale, and aimed to capitalize on what he 
termed the ‘monster power’ of ‘rootless white males’ who spent much of their time online 
(Green, 2017: 235). My account of Bannon must be prefaced with a caveat: it is perhaps 
impossible to give an account of the 2016 Trump campaign without risking playing into 
Bannon’s desired self-image as a master manipulator. As I hope the below account 
demonstrates, Bannon conceptualizes reputation warfare, but does not initiate it, so much as 
he seeks to mobilize and harness tendencies already present on platforms. I read his campaign 
as an agent through which platform tendencies are taken to their logical limit, and through 
which their financiality comes readily to light. Since reputation warfare is quickly 
generalizing, the urgency of clearly understanding these tactics, in my judgment, far 
outweighs the risks. 
Taking over from Trump’s previous campaign strategist Paul Manafort in August 
2016, Bannon has been credited with turning Trump’s then floundering candidacy toward 
victory. Yet Bannon had long been discrediting Trump’s opponents-to-be. Arguably, his 
campaign begun in 2012, when he took over the far-right American news, opinion and 
commentary website Breitbart News, using it to interest the aforementioned ‘rootless white 
males’ (Green, 2017: 235) in populist nationalism. He installed controversial tech editor Milo 
Yiannopoulos at Breitbart, stating: “I realized Milo could connect with these kids right away. 
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[…] You can activate that army. They come in through Gamergate or whatever and then get 
turned onto politics and Trump” (ibid., 2017: 237). Bannon also backed Peter Schweizer’s 
book Clinton Cash: The Untold Story of How and Why Foreign Governments and Businesses 
Helped make Bill and Hillary Rich (2015): a thoroughly researched attack on Trump’s 
opponent, Democrat Hillary Clinton’s reputation from which, as Green argues (2017: 11), she 
never fully recovered. While attacking political opponents’ reputation is nothing new, several 
factors made reputation especially significant in the 2016 Trump-Clinton race, in addition to 
Hearn’s point above that Trump’s candidacy tapped into the general foregrounding of 
reputation in an age of mini-celebrity and high-stakes visibility (2016: 658). Among these 
were the ‘professional anti-Clinton operatives’ (Green, 2017: 81), such as Kellyanne 
Conway, working on the Trump campaign, who had spent entire careers specializing in 
attacking the Clintons. Another factor was the importance of a group of prospective voters 
that Cambridge Analytica data scientists installed in the Trump campaign dubbed ‘double-
haters’ (ibid.: 364), who disliked both Trump and Clinton, but were highly likely to vote. 
Because swing voters were likely to vote against the candidate they disliked the most, 
attacking the opponent’s reputation was especially important. The Trump campaign was 
innovative in both its online targeting of voters, and its mobilization of online trolls, on a 
number of fronts – not all of which were perpetrated by Bannon, and many of which I will 
not focus on here. The controversial data firm Cambridge Analytica – backed by hedge fund 
billionaire and far-right funder Robert Mercer, who knew Bannon for years through Breitbart 
– allowed it to micro-target swing voters with unprecedented psycho-social detail, gleaned 
from breached Facebook data on over 50 million users (Percily, 2017; Cadwalladr, 2017; 
Cadwalladr and Graham-Harrison, 2018). (Bannon is a former board member and vice-
president of Cambridge Analytica.) As I write, debates continue as to the level of impact the 
Facebook data breach had on the 2016 U.S. election. Also suspected of influencing the 
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election was Russia’s notorious, government-backed Internet Research Agency (nicknamed 
The Troll Factory) in which under-cover St. Petersburg trolls were paid in cash to infiltrate 
message boards with destabilizing, pro-Putin, and sometimes pro-Trump messages 
(MacFarquhar, 2018; Aro, 2016). While mobilizing 4chan, 8chan and reddit communities 
was but one trolling innovation associated with the 2016 Trump election, focusing on this 
aspect of the campaign allows us to analyse how strategists have begun to capitalize on 
‘grassroots’ reputational volatility, fomented in online forums.  
Steve Bannon’s Reputation Strategy 
To understand how Bannon understood reputational attack according to real options 
theory, it is helpful to look at his career history. While I do not wish to over-emphasize 
biography, Bannon’s unusual career path doubtless enabled a blend of militaristic, business 
and financial insights to inform his approach to online reputation. Bannon served as a U.S. 
naval officer, (Green, 2017: 17), and later enrolled at Harvard Business School and landed a 
job at Goldman Sachs during the hostile-takeover boom (ibid.: 113). Heading to Hollywood 
during a Wall Street-driven merger frenzy, Bannon found himself devising new methods to 
value Hollywood film companies’ intellectual property (ibid.: 121), and advising on multiple 
takeovers and acquisitions. After briefly staging a takeover of the Artist Management Group 
and rethinking the way it branded its talent (ibid.: 132), Bannon joined Internet Gaming 
Entertainment, a gold farming company which paid largely Chinese workers low wages to 
play the massively multiplayer online role-playing game World of Warcraft, so that the 
company could sell in-game prizes on to paying customers. Bannon raised $60 million from 
Goldman Sachs for Internet Gaming Entertainment; nonetheless, angry online gamers shut 
down the business, unimpressed by the cheating Internet Gaming Entertainment enabled. 
They expressed some of their anger in the form of racist attacks against low-paid gold 
farmers. (Racism directed against Asian World of Warcraft players has long been intertwined 
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with suspicions of gold farming – see Nakamura, 2009). The shut-down made Bannon think 
about how he might harness the political power of angry white men who spent much of their 
lives online (Green, 2017: 135). This, in turn, influenced his subsequent management of 
Breitbart News, through which Bannon aimed to interest vitriolic online communities in far-
right politics. Throughout his career, Bannon developed a skill set that enabled him to 
develop an options theory-inflected understanding of online reputation, based on the online 
crowd as swarm of optionable vitriol, which could be tapped into as and when politically 
expedient. 
Options-Theory Optimal 
 In derivative finance, an option contract gives the option, but not the obligation, to 
sell or buy an underlying asset at a fixed price, at a fixed point in the future. By giving access 
to a fixed price on a future trade, options allow prospective buyers and sellers to hedge the 
uncertainty of the market. As Gong, Van der Stede and Young argue, real options – ‘the 
right, but not the obligation, to undertake a business decision’ (2011: 1438) are essential in 
the film industry, which continually faces high degrees of uncertainty. For instance, a 
company’s decision to continue marketing a particular film, or not (depending on how well it 
tracks on its opening weekend) is an abandonment option; the decision to make a sequel of a 
popular film is a growth option (ibid.: 1439). Bannon, steeped in finance on Wall Street and 
in Hollywood, was well-placed to conceptualize online crowds through real options 
frameworks: as potential reputational volatility, which could be claimed for one’s own 
campaign, or abandoned, as expedient in future. As Randy Martin writes, ‘the logically 
incompatible maneuver of committing to one decision and keeping open others is what 
derivatives make possible, general, and desirable’ (2015: 58). By engineering a line from the 
‘monster power’ of rootless white men online, through Breitbart News, to far-right politics, 
Bannon orchestrated a scenario by which he was able to render online communities’ ‘monster 
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power’ optionable, such that “before long, denizens of 4chan and reddit were coordinating 
support for Trump’s campaign” (Green, 2017: 238).  
Indeed, some members of the ‘shitposting army’ understood themselves as efficient 
value-generators for Trump’s campaign. For instance, a post on the reddit board 
r/The_Donald contains a meta-commentary about “4chan on Hillary vs Trump,” featuring a 
screenshot of an anonymous 4chan post, dated 23 July, 2016 (just before Bannon took over 
the Trump campaign, though possibly already influenced by Bannon through Breitbart 
News):  
 hillary 
 > 732 staff 
 > dumps $1,000,000 to spread propaganda online 
 > has to hire millennials to think up memes for her 
 > has most of MSM [sic] in pocket 
 > 313M in donations, 5x what trump has 
 
 trump 
 > 70 staff 
 > blessing of kek 
 > has army of NEETs and centipedes shitposting 24/7 for free 
 > generates 2 billion in free media airtime through the power of 5D chess 
 > 65M in donations, 97% small donators [sic] 
  
 > tied in polls (Anonymous, 2016) 
 
This characterization of the race tacitly acknowledges that the two campaigns shared some 
common tactics, even though their status as paid or unpaid differed. This commentator 
understands the blessing of ‘kek’ (an ambiguous word associated with online alt-right, pro-
Trump culture) in terms of an ability to generate voluntary online vitriol. Further, it expresses 
pleasure in generating expropriable value for the campaign. Since these communities were at 
arms-length from the campaign, Bannon could both mobilize, and disavow, the often racist, 
misogynist ‘shitposting army’, as expedient, as if purchasing an option on online reputational 
volatility.    
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 For Martin, derivative finance understands volatility itself as a source of value. Far 
from reducing the volatility of financial value, ‘the myriad protocols of risk management 
evident across professional fields […] generate, foment, and constitute the very volatility 
they seek to master and profit from’ (2015: 3). Derivatives, while ostensibly managing risk, 
actually amount to ‘instruments of risk management that generated unmanageable risk’ (ibid.: 
5). Derivatives perform the limits of knowledge, as pervasive risk management actively 
distorts the futures calculated: ‘the very mathematical models meant to control risk wound up 
making the markets unsustainably risky’ (ibid.: 27). Understanding derivative logic as 
broadly social, rather than merely economic, Martin contends, allows us ‘to recognize ways 
in which the concrete particularities – the specific engagements, commitments, and 
interventions we tender and expend – might be interconnected without first or ultimately 
needing to appear as a single whole or unity of practice or perspective’ (ibid: 52). Martin’s 
analysis of the social logic of the derivative can be applied to ubiquitous reputation-
calculation – which, far from producing any certainty in reputation’s value, produces even 
more reputational volatility, which in turn produces new fields of tactical intervention. The 
reddit post above is but one reflection on how producing reputational volatility becomes a 
distinct and recognized aim – one that strategists like Bannon are all too happy to optionalize.  
 Bannon’ real options-inflected approach to reputational volatility was mirrored by 
Trump himself – the very figure of volatility, spreading disruption all around him, yet 
seemingly immune to its effects. Since Trump made little attempt to build ‘incremental’ 
reputation capital as a trustworthy, consistent presidential candidate (as Clinton had done 
throughout her career), his reputation seemed much less affected by attempts to discredit him 
than was his opponent’s. Trump and Bannon’s double act as ‘front of house’ and ‘behind the 
scenes’ figures of reputational volatility arguably emblematized not the ideal of the ‘good’ 
president, but rather finance’s increasing stranglehold on politics. As Ivan Ascher asks, ‘is 
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there not an elective affinity between the world of modern finance – which runs on risk and 
volatility – and the prospect of an erratic, nihilistic, fear-mongering billionaire becoming the 
next President of the United States?’ (2017) For Ascher,  
…today’s portfolio managers do not care about yesterday’s stock price, any more than 
the President-elect will care tomorrow about what he tweeted this morning. In both 
cases, all that matters is the volatility created by unpredictable quotes – a volatility 
that may be devastating for those whose reputations are at stake, but can be wildly 
lucrative for those who know how to capture it (ibid.). 
 
Bannon (and surely many figures to follow) typify the eagerness to capture the volatility of 
online reputations. In doing so, they instantiate revenge politics as a ‘cultural illogic of 
belated capitalism’ (Haiven, 2017: 31), which extends and exacerbates capitalism’s long-
standing vengefulness against whole populations at random (ibid.: 32), yet offers substantial 
gain to well-placed tacticians.iv 
 
Conclusion 
From reputation capital to reputation warfare: online reputation has shifted away from 
incremental, measurable and relatively stable reputational paradigm, toward an understanding 
of reputation according to a cultural logic of volatility. This logic has provided the basis for 
indirect, real-options-inflected interventions into reputational volatility: reputation warfare. 
The tactics associated with reputation warfare are infused with financial logic; thus, 
accounting for these developments requires close attention to how online reputation extends 
the reach of financial valuation, forming part of a biopolitical framework that governs users’ 
online existence and everyday practices. In this paper, I have extended existing accounts of 
financialization within the spheres of reputation, data aggregation and social media, in hopes 
of demonstrating how the financialized, ‘reputation warfare’ paradigm generalizes as a 
platform metalogic, transcending the bounds of both specific platforms, and specific 
behaviours that appear motivated by direct capital gain. Rather than focusing exclusively on 
how a particular platform financializes its users’ reputations, I have instead aimed to draw 
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attention to how financially-inflected means of modelling reputational volatility imprint 
themselves across a wide range of apparatuses and behaviours – from seller ratings on 
Amazon, to Twitter shaming, to Bannon’s mobilization of anti-Hillary Clinton posts. My 
account of the reputation warfare paradigm emphatically de-emphasizes the direct 
profitability of specific reputational attacks. The reputation capital paradigm (also a financial 
paradigm, but one more firmly tied to credit than to volatility and real options) still operates 
today, even if it has been eclipsed. It strongly emphasizes the potential payoff of cultivating a 
good online reputation, insofar as polishing one’s profile constitutes a form of ‘venture 
labour’ (Gandini, 2015: 91), leading to indirect gains such as higher-paid work or better 
interest rates. On the other hand, the reputation warfare paradigm is split. Platforms such as 
Twitter, and tacticians such as Bannon, find the ‘payoff’ in reputational volatility (for 
instance, increased platform engagement, or eventual election votes). On the other hand, a 
‘shitstorm’’s (Han, 2017: 3) participants may simply have little to lose (Davies, 2018: 20). 
Their meta-commentaries suggest motivation, in part, by the feeling of co-constituting the 
online crowd’s violent meta-(ill)logic: collectively moving the dials, voting on someone’s 
online repute or notoriety and watching the change come over the measures in real time. 
Strangely collectivized attacks against users seem to heed the demand for volatility itself to 
be voiced – to speak through, and as, collaboratively-orchestrated shifts in reputation capital. 
Of course, this urge to voice volatility is readily trumped.  
 I can think of no better language to describe this emergent layer of tactical 
intervention into reputational volatility than real options theory, which both harnesses and 
exacerbates volatility, keeping options open for some actors far more than others. According 
to the ‘financialization of daily life’ (Martin, 2002), we might attribute great reach to what 
Edward LiPuma has termed the ‘politics of optionality’ (2017:352). Embodying the 
problematic personalization of online networks, online reputation is a crucial site in which to 
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study who can devise means to ‘purchase options’ on volatility, and who remains 
dispossessed: from the value of reputation’s volatility, and from reputation capital as such. 
Equally, understanding how online reputation enacts a ‘social logic of the derivative’ 
(Martin, 2015) across heterogeneous acts, apparatuses and platforms can inform activist 
counter-strategies, which also intervene in reputational volatility, and find ways to answer to 
the widening distribution of inequality in online reputation. Reputation, as a concept, has 
long lent social inequality a logic, of sorts. Today, via reputation warfare’s tactical 
interventions into volatility, that inequality has a double valence.  
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i I would like to thank one of the anonymous peer reviewers for contributing to this point. As Luciano Floridi 
argues, Bourdieu’s forms of capital tend to “presuppose economic capital as a foundational concept” (2018: 
483), by reading other forms of capital as if they were not yet economic. Elsewhere, it would be interesting to 
expand on a theory of reputation as it relates to Floridi’s recent theory of semantic capital – which understands 
capital primarily “in terms of what we care about, not merely of what we are ready to pay for” (ibid.).   
ii This point is underscored by Florian Cramer’s study of alt-right meme culture, in which online trolls often 
self-deprecatingly cast themselves as abject, lonely, unshaven white men (2017). 
iii The term ‘reputation warfare’ has been previously used – for instance, by Gaines-Ross (2010) to refer to 
targeted attacks on corporate reputation. I would like to reframe this term to emphasize large scale, indirectness 
of strategy, and an emphasis on volatility. 
iv Although it is beyond the scope of this paper, it would be fruitful for future work to focus on how activist 
movements, such as #MeToo, also mobilize reputational volatility – even though there is no consensus that this 
is an express aim of the movement. As Debra Jackson argues, #MeToo should be understood in terms of “victim 
empowerment and solidarity, not vigilante justice” (Jackson, 2018: 16).  
 
